

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STOCKH 01919 01 OF 02 211513Z

50

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SR-02 ORM-01 IO-10 AID-05 FDRE-00

NIC-01 ACDA-05 SSO-00 USIE-00 VO-03 SCA-01 INRE-00

NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SAM-01 /090 W

----- 105485

O R 211420Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4486

INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USNATO

USMISSION USUN

USMISSION USDEL JEC PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 1919

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: VS, VN, SW

SUBJECT: SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S VIEWS ON RVN-PRG  
NEGOTIATIONS

REF: STOCKHOLM 1627

1. SUMMARY. FOREIGN MINISTER ANDERSSON SUMMONED ME TO HIS HOME SUNDAY AFTERNOON TO INFORM ME OF THE IMPRESSIONS HE HAD GAINED FROM HIS TALKS LAST WEEK IN PARIS WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVARNARGUES AND FROM SECRETARY GENERAL ASTROM'S CONTACTS WITH PHAM BAN BA. ANDERSSON SAID GOS IS PERSUADED THAT PRG IS "SERIOUSLY INTERESTED" IN NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT WITH SAIGON, WITH THE ONLY PRECONDITION THE RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT THEIU. HOWEVER, HE CAUTIONED THAT SHOULD THE MILITARY  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STOCKH 01919 01 OF 02 211513Z

SITUATION OF SAIGON DETERIORATE FURTHER, THE PRG MIGHT

LOSE INTEREST IN NEGOTIATION. ANDERSSON SPOKE OF INCREASING PRESSURES FROM HIS OWN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY FOR RECOGNITION OF PRG. HE SAID THAT HE AND PRIME MINISTER PALME WOULD CONTINUE FOR THE PRESENT TO RESIST SUCH PRESSURES, SHOULD THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WORSEN PERCEPTIBLY, THEN THE GOS WOULD FEEL CONSTRAINED TO MOVE TOWARDS RECOGNITION OF THE PRG. I ASSURED THE FOREIGN MINISTER I WOULD REPORT HIS VIEWS ON THE PRG ATTITUDE TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS PROMPTLY TO MY GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER SVEN ANDERSSON CALLED ME TO HIS RESIDENCE LATE SUNDAY AFTERNOON. ANDERSSON SAID HE WISHED TO CONVEY TO ME THE IMPRESSION GAINED FROM HIS TALKS LAST WEEK IN PARIS WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVARNARGUES AS WELL AS THOSE OF SECRETARY GENERAL SVERKER ASTROM WITH PHAM VAN BA, THE PRG'S "AMBASSADOR AT LARGE" IN EUROPE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT SINCE HE LEAVES TODAY (APRIL 21) FOR TEL AVIV, HE WANTED TO PASS ON THIS INFORMATION PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE.

3. ANDERSSON SAID THAT IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH SAUVARNARGUES AS WELL AS ASTROM'S WITH PHAM VAN BA, THE SWEDES HAD TRIED TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF FINDING A MEANS TO GET PEACE TALKS INITIATED BETWEEN THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT AND THE PRG IN ORDER TO AVOID FURTHER BLOODSHED IN VIETNAM. ACCORDING TO ANDERSSON, SAUVARNARGUES HAD COMMENTED THAT HE HAD TRIED TO PASS ON TO THE USG HIS (SAUVARNARGUES') VIEWS ON THIS TOPIC BUT HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS NOT "GETTING THROUGH" TO HIS AMERICAN LISTENERS.

4. THE MAIN IMPRESSION THE GOS DERIVED FROM ITS TALKS IN PARIS IS THAT THE PRG IS "SERIOUSLY INTERESTED" IN NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT WITH THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT. THE REASONS FOR THIS, THE SWEDES BELIEVE, ARE TWO: FIRST, THE PRG IS CONCERNED THAT BY SEEMING TOO INTRANSIGENT TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS IT WOULD DAMAGE ITS INTERNATIONAL IMAGE AND SECONDLY, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STOCKH 01919 01 OF 02 211513Z

THE PRG WOULD LIKE TO AVOID THE SACRIFICE OF MEN AND MATERIEL THAT AN ALL-OUT ASSAULT ON SAIGON WOULD ENTAIL. ANDERSSON EMPHASIZED THAT, AS OF LAST WEEK, THE PRG SEEMED GENUINELY INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATIONS; HOWEVER, SHOULD THE MILITARY POSITION OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT DETERIORATE RAPIDLY, THE PRG MIGHT WELL LOSE INTEREST IN NEGOTIATIONS.

5. I REPLIED THAT THE INTEREST OF THE PRG IN NEGOTIATIONS IS ALL WELL AND GOOD, BUT ASKED WHAT PRECONDITIONS THE PRG HAD SET TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS, POINTING OUT THAT THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE OTHER SIDE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. ANDERSSON ANSWERED THAT THE PRG IS INSISTENT THAT PRESIDENT THIEU MUST GO AND "SOME OF THE GENERALS" AS WELL. HOWEVER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER ADDED THAT HE WOULD WISH TO CHECK OUT THIS POINT FURTHER WITH ASTROM. (LATER, ANDERSSON AIDE NOTIFIED ME THAT THE ONLY PRECONDITION OF THE PRG WAS THE REMOVAL OF THIEU ALONE FROM OFFICE. HE ADDED THAT IT IS, OF COURSE, NOT POSSIBLE TO KNOW WHAT OTHER CONDITIONS THE PRG MIGHT PRESENT ONCE THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN. I REPLIED THAT THE USG IS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO A POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND THAT ONLY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE COULD DECIDE WHO THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AT ANY NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE.

6. ANDERSSON SAID THAT LAST WEEK BOTH HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD MADE SPEECHES AT SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY MEETINGS IN LINKOPING AND STOCKHOLM, RESPECTIVELY, AND HAD FACED CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM PARTY MEMBERS FOR IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION OF THE PRG. IT WAS ONLY BY STRENUOUS EFFORT THAT THEY HAD BEEN ABLE TO WARD OFF SUCH PRESSURES. ANDERSSON SAID THE PRIME MINISTER AND HE HAD USED THE ARGUMENT THAT IF THE GOS WERE TO RECOGNIZE THE PRG NOW,

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STOCKH 01919 02 OF 02 211516Z

50

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SR-02 ORM-01 IO-10 AID-05 FDRE-00

ACDA-05 SSO-00 USIE-00 VO-03 SCA-01 INRE-00 NSCE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SAM-01 /089 W

----- 105497

O R 211420Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4487

INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI  
AMEMBASSY OSLO  
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK  
AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USNATO  
USMISSION USUN  
USMISSION USDEL JEC PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 1919

IT WOULD NO LONGER BE ABLE TO WORK FOR THE INITIATION  
OF NEGOTIATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PARIS AGREEMENTS.  
I ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER IF HE FELT THE GOS WOULD  
BE ABLE TO "HOLD THE LINE" ON THE PRG RECOGNITION  
QUESTION. ANDERSSON REPLIED THAT FOR THE MOMENT THE  
GOS WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT MOVE TO RECOGNIZE THE PRG, BUT  
ADDED THAT IF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENTS SITUATION DETERIORATED  
DRAMATICALLY, THEN THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT WOULD FEEL  
OBLIGED TO RECOGNIZE THE PRG AS THE DEFACTO GOVERNMENT  
OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

7. I EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GOS  
RESISTING PRESSURES FOR PRG RECOGNITION, POINT OUT  
THAT IT WOULD LEAD TO A PROLONGATION OF THE WAR  
RATHER THAN NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE SUCH ACTION BY THE GOS  
AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS WOULD ONLY HARDEN THE ATTITUDE  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STOCKH 01919 02 OF 02 211516Z

OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT. I ADDED THAT WHILE THE CURRENT  
MILITARY SITUATION OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT DOES APPEAR  
BLEAK, THE FORTUNES OF WAR COULD CHANGE AND A STALEMATE  
MIGHT DEVELOP. ANDERSSON SAID THAT THE GOS IS AWARE  
OF THE USG DESIRE TO GET NEGOTIATIONS UNDERWAY.

8. I TOLD ANDERSSON I WOULD NOTIFY MY GOVERNMENT  
PROMPTLY OF THE GOS VIEWS, AND WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH  
WITH HIM IF I RECEIVED ANY REACTION.

9. COMMENT: THE FACT THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER TOOK  
THE UNUSUAL STEP OF SUMMONING ME TO HIS RESIDENCE ON  
A SUNDAY AFTERNOON PERSUADES ME THAT, DURING HIS TRIP  
TO PARIS LAST WEEK, HE MUST HAVE RECEIVED REASONABLY  
CONVINCING INDICATIONS THAT THE PRG IS WILLING TO OPEN  
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT. ANDERSSON  
HAD INFORMED ME EARLIER (REFTEL), THAT THE SWEDES  
APPEAR CONVINCED THAT THE PRG, IN CONTRAST WITH  
HANOI, WOULD PREFER A POLITICAL SOLUTION RATHER THAN  
A MILITARY ONE. THE REPORTED RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT  
THIEU THIS AFTERNOON WOULD SEEM TO ADD TO THE TIMELINESS

OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S INFORMATION.  
STRAUSZ-HUPE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, POLITICAL SITUATION, PEACE TALKS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 21 APR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975STOCKH01919  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750139-0317  
**From:** STOCKHOLM  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750430/aaaabcpt.tel  
**Line Count:** 225  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 75 STOCKHOLM 1627  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 30 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <30 APR 2003 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <01 MAY 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S VIEWS ON RVN-PRG NEGOTIATIONS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PINT, VS, VN, SW, PRG, (ANDERSSON, SWEN)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006